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Abstract
We investigate under which conditions price competition in a market with matching frictions
leads to sorting of buyers and sellers. Positive assortative matching obtains only if there is a high
enough degree of complementarity between buyer and seller types. The relevant condition is root-
supermodularity; i.e., the square root of the match value function is supermodular. It is a necessary
and sucient condition for positive assortative matching under any distribution of buyer and seller
types, and does not depend on the details of the underlying matching function that describes the
search process. The condition is weaker than log-supermodularity, a condition required for positive
assortative matching in markets with random search. This highlights the role competition plays in
matching heterogeneous agents. Negative assortative matching obtains whenever the match value
function is weakly submodular.
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11 Introduction
In many economic environments, heterogeneous agents on two sides of the market match to generate
gains from trade. In the labor market, rms with diverse technologies hire workers who dier in ability
and qualications; buyers of durables have dierent preferences over dierentiated goods; and in the
marriage market men and women dier in appearance and income. Individual and aggregate outcomes
depend on who trades with whom. A central question in the literature therefore is to understand the
pattern of trade, in particular the conditions under which attractive types on one side of the market
trade with attractive types on the other side. In markets with a centralized market clearing institution,
the relevant requirement for such positive assortative matching is supermodularity (Becker (1973)).
Under supermodularity, or equivalently complementarity, high types have a comparative advantage
when matching with other high types.
In many markets, a centralized market clearing institution is absent and price competition is decen-
tralized. Sellers compete in prices, for example by posting wages in the labor market or by posting prices
for durables on platforms like Yahoo!, Craigslist or Amazon. Under such decentralized competition {
often referred to as Competitive Search or Directed Search { frictions in the trading process prevent
perfect market clearing.1 This arises for example when lack of coordination leads multiple workers to
approach the same rm for a single job, which results in structural unemployment. It also arises in
goods markets when too many buyers contact a common seller who gets stocked out. This induces a
non-trivial probability that agents cannot trade. Lower prices attract more buyers, and thereby aect
the probability of trade. For example in the housing market, higher priced houses { ceteris paribus {
have a lower sales probability in any given time period. The interaction of the trading probability and
price competition is therefore at the heart of our understanding of such environments.
In the presence of such frictions, we investigate under which conditions attractive buyer types
match with attractive seller types. To see the role of frictions, consider the complementarity-free case
of additive match values. In the frictionless world, any trading pattern is ecient and can be sustained
in equilibrium (Becker (1973)). In our setup the frictions lead to an equilibrium allocation that is
negatively assorted. The reason is that now there are two distinct mechanisms at work that motivate
match formation: One is the intrinsic value of a match, and the other is the likelihood of obtaining one.
The latter is the sole driving force of the matching pattern in the absence of complementarities. High
valuation buyers are willing to pay a high price in order to minimize the probability of no trade. Some
sellers provide \trading security" by attracting few buyers, who then trade with high probability. The
low type sellers are those who nd it optimal to provide this service for the buyers, as their opportunity
cost of not trading is lowest. This results in negative assortative matching: high type buyers match
with low type sellers. In the housing market for example, sellers of identical houses but with a low
opportunity cost of holding on to it (because they still use their property) charge a high price and wait
1See amongst others Peters (1997b) and Moen (1997).
2longer to sell, and buyers who have a particular urgency to move will contact exactly these high price
sellers because the chance that some other buyer competes for the property is low. Even a moderate
degree of supermodularity will not revert the matching pattern into positive assortative matching, as the
\trading-security" motive dominates the \match value" motive. Therefore, sucient supermodularity
is needed for positive assortative matching to overcome this tendency for negative sorting.
Our main nding is that root-supermodularity { i.e. supermodularity of the square root of the
match value function { is necessary and sucient for the dominance of the \match value" motive over
the \trading-security" motive. To understand the mechanics behind this requirement, observe that
the square-root is a concave transformation. Standard supermodularity implies that the total value
of mixed matches (where low types match with high types) is lower than the total value generated
by extreme matches (where high types match with high types). In the presence of the \match value"
motive only, and no frictions, this leads to positive sorting. In our model with frictions the possibility
that trade does not occur is particularly harmful for high types who gain most from trade. Therefore,
their concern for \trading security" makes them the rst to abandon the positive assortative matching
pattern if this increases their matching probability. Positive sorting is therefore only obtained under
a stronger condition than in the frictionless environment of Becker (1973). To see this, observe that
taking the n-th-root of the match value function concavies it whenever n > 1, thus making it harder
for the total value of the extreme matches to dominate that of mixed matches. In our context with
decentralized competition, a concavication by taking the square root (n = 2) suces for positive
assortative matching, while frictionless trade requires no transformation (n = 1).
Compared to random search however, where positive assortative matching requires log-supermodula-
rity (n ! 1) as in Shimer and Smith (2000) and Smith (2006), in our model a lower degree of comple-
mentarity is needed. In random search models agents meet each other without any prior information
about type or transfer price. In our environment with competition, agents can be selective about price
and quality without necessarily having to meet with types that will never be accepted in equilibrium.
This selection mitigates some of the frictions and highlights the role of competition in the matching
of heterogeneous agents in our model. Our condition for positive assortative matching therefore falls
between those for frictionless trade of Becker and random search. Yet, when it comes to negative
assortative matching, our results dier substantially. As we argued above, in the absence of any su-
permodularity the allocation is negatively assorted. In fact, this is the case for any weakly submodular
match value function. Negative assortative matching obtains only under stronger conditions both in
the frictionless case (strict submodularity) and with random search (log-submodularity).
Our requirement of root-supermodularity is necessary and sucient to obtain Positive Assortative
Matching under any distribution of types. In particular, it will be binding whenever the ratio of buyers
to sellers in some market goes to zero, which is always the case for type distribution where some
sellers cannot trade. For some distributions this is not a binding restriction, and in this case there are
match value functions that are less than root-supermodular and nonetheless induce positive assortative
3matching. More interestingly, we show that for some distributions there is negative assortative matching
even when the match value function is moderately supermodular. To our knowledge, this is new in the
literature.
In Section 5 we analyze three extensions. First, we explore the boundaries of our results when we
relax some of the restrictions that we place on the matching function. We focus on the CES matching
function which has dierent properties than the usual micro-founded matching functions and provide
a remarkably simple characterization which may prove useful in applications. Second, we show that
our condition for assortative matching continues to hold if we extend our model to a dynamic setting,
independent of the discount factor.2 Third, we modify the payo structure so that both sides of the
market have preferences over the types they match with, as is the case for example in the marriage
market.
The driving force behind our result is the presence of trading frictions. These seem important in
the housing or labor market, where waiting times and unemployment duration are a major concern.
Nonetheless, it is instructive to link our environment to the large literature on the foundations of com-
petitive equilibria by considering the limit as frictions vanish. In our case the competitive benchmark is
Becker (1973), which requires standard supermodularity for positive sorting. We analyze the limit when
the discount factor in our dynamic extension approaches unity, and nd instead that along the entire
sequence root-supermodularity continues to be a necessary and sucient condition for positive assorta-
tive matching. Our condition remains binding locally around those seller types who cannot trade, e.g.,
due to unequal sizes on each side of the market, yet relaxes to supermodularity elsewhere. It remains
binding because a very low probability of trading can oset the increased patience. In the limit, simple
supermodularity suces almost everywhere. Our ndings are therefore consistent with the frictionless
case of Becker (1973) and contribute to the understanding of the foundations for competitive (match-
ing) markets. In a less orthodox approach to vanishing frictions, we consider a convergent sequence
of matching functions in our static economy such that in the limit the short side of the market gets
matched with certainty. We conrm the ndings that we obtain for the limit of the dynamic economy.
To our knowledge, considering vanishing frictions as the limit of a sequence of static matching functions
is new in this literature on foundations for competitive equilibrium.
2 Relation to the Literature.
Our model has three key features: two-sided heterogeneity with complementarities, decentralized price
competition, and a general specication of the matching frictions.
As mentioned above, our model builds on the frictionless matching model with two-sided hetero-
geneity due to Becker (1973) where positive assortative matching obtains under strict supermodularity.
2A similar observation can be made for random search models where the log-supermodularity conditions are also
independent of the discount factor.
4Adding random search frictions in this environment with transfers was rst done by Shimer and Smith
(2000). In random search assortative matching is a set-valued concept, because the random nature of
the meetings makes it infeasible to wait for the perfect type. In the absence of complementarities, the
opportunity cost of waiting is higher for high types and therefore strong degrees of supermodularity are
needed to ensure positive assortative matching. In our model we add frictions to Becker's model but
we reserve a special role for prices in the allocation of heterogeneous agents.
The literature on decentralized price competition combines the Walrasian spirit of competition with
a notion of frictions that provides a rationale for unemployment in the labor market and waiting times
in the product market.3 Our model falls into the broad class of Walrasian models of contract markets.
Each of the contracts, i.e., a price and quality combination, is traded in a separate market. Pricing
is competitive in the sense that sellers can aect the amount of trade by changing the oered price.
Such Walrasian models of contract markets (Peters (1997b), Mortensen and Wright (2002)) assume
that the expectations of traders about out of equilibrium market positions, i.e., in inactive markets,
adjust consistent with rational expectations. This assumption basically entails that all traders believe
that the number of traders in the inactive markets is large, and that they have common beliefs of
what happens in those markets.4 It is often strengthened by assuming that trading probabilities in all
markets, including the inactive ones, lie on the same indierence curve for workers (Moen 1997). We
use the broader denition and show as a result that with worker heterogeneity it is the indierence of
the worker type who is most eager to trade in each market that is important.
Most existing models of decentralized price competition deal with homogeneous buyers. Exceptions
with two-sided heterogeneity include Mortensen and Wright (2002) who analyze a private valuation
environment without complementarities under a general specication of the matching frictions. In an
economy with free entry of rms and urn-ball matching, Shi (2001) analyzes the eciency of positive
assortative matching of the equilibrium allocation. In his environment rms are ex-ante identical
and can choose to enter with dierent types that have dierent costs, and he shows that positive
assortative matching necessarily requires strong enough complementarities. Shi (2002) and Shimer
(2005) consider perfect observability of buyer characteristics and a type-contingent menu of prices and
trading priorities.5 Under urn-ball matching this ex-post selection between dierent types leads to
3Without attempting to be exhaustive, examples include Peters (1991), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a and b), Shi
(2001), Mortensen and Wright (2002), Rocheteau and Wright (2005), Galenianos and Kircher (2006), Kircher (2007),
Delacroix and Shi (2006).
4Models providing microfoundations often interpret each seller as a market, see e.g. Peters (1997b and 2000) and
and Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001). The strategic foundations for those out-of-equilibrium beliefs are obtained by
modeling deviations in the form of a (sub)game with a nite number of homogeneous players. They show that equilibrium
allocations in the decentralized Walrasian models of contract markets coincide with the allocations in the limit of nite
subgame perfect equilibria when the market size increases. Inactive markets in the limit game can therefore be interpreted
as deviations by sellers in large nite games who correctly anticipate the eects of those deviations on buyers' behavior.
5Peters (2007) considers observable heterogeneity in the absence of contractibility on the part of the rms.
5imperfect sorting in equilibrium.6
In our base-line model buyer types are not observed, but nevertheless the price of each seller con-
stitutes a complete contract in the sense that seller valuations are not aected by unobservable buyer
types. While our set up is one of price competition in the Walrasian spirit, our model is nonetheless
related to the ones of McAfee (1993) and Peters (1997a) who analyze competition in auctions. Without
complementarities this seemingly minor dierence of using competitive pricing rather than auctions
leads to very dierent equilibrium outcomes. Competitive pricing leads to perfect sorting of buyers
and sellers because the prices allow competing sellers to screen dierent valuation buyers ex ante. High
valuation buyers are willing to pay more in order to avoid a long queue of potential competing buyers.
Thus, buyers reveal their type by \voting with their feet". Auctions lead to random meetings and
ex-post screening.7 The role of auctions under complementarities are yet unexplored.
Finally, we derive our results in the context of a general specication of the matching frictions.
While this is common in the random search and labor literature, it is not always used in the context
of directed search where the matching function is typically the urn-ball process.8 We nd that our
main result does not depend on the specics of the matching function. This is surprising because the
condition for positive assortative matching is completely determined by an expression that depends on
the matching function, yet that expression has a common maximum for all functions in the general class
we consider. In addition, the general matching function allows us to consider the competitive limit as
matching frictions vanish in a static environment.
3 The Model
Players: The economy consists of buyers and sellers. Each seller has one good for sale. Sellers are
heterogeneous and indexed by a type y 2 Y that is observable. Let S(y) denote the measure of sellers
with types weakly below y 2 Y: We assume Y =[y;y]  R+, and S(y) denotes the overall measure of
sellers. On the other side of the market there is a unit mass of buyers. Buyers dier in their valuation
for the good, which is their private information. Each buyer draws his type x i.i.d. from distribution
B(x) on X =[x;x]  R+. S and B are C2 and with strictly positive derivatives s and b; respectively.
Preferences. The value of a good consumed by buyer x and bought from seller y is given by f(x;y);
6The imperfect sorting depends on the assumption of the matching technology. It arises under urn-ball matching, but
is unlikely to arise for example under bilateral matching. (See also Footnote 7.)
7This result of the competing mechanism design literature depends on the exact nature of the matching frictions. Both
McAfee (1993) and Peters (1997a) consider (a strategic version of) urn-ball meeting frictions. In Eeckhout and Kircher
(2008) we consider a related model with general frictions in which sellers have a choice about the mechanism. In such
a setting, price posting constitutes an optimal (equilibrium) sales mechanism under some specications of the meeting
frictions, e.g. when meetings are bilateral.
8For discrete time directed search models an exception is the partially directed search model of Menzio (2007). In
continuous time competitive search models general matching functions are more common.
6where f is a strictly positive function f : R2
+!R++: Conditional on consuming and paying a price p,
the utility of the buyer is f(x;y)   p and that of the seller is p.9 That is, agents have quasi-linear
utilities. We consider indices x and y that are ordered such that they increase the utility of the buyer:
fx > 0; fy > 0. We assume that f is twice continuously dierentiable in (x;y): The utility of an agent
who does not consume is normalized to zero. Clearly, no trade takes place at prices below 0 and above
f(x;y); and we dene the set of feasible prices as P = R+: All agents maximize their expected utility.
Action sets. Sellers decide at which price they want to trade. The sellers trade decisions leads
to some joint distribution function F(p;y) over feasible prices and seller types. Distribution F is
permissible if its marginal over y coincides with S(y)=S(y): Buyers decide on the price and the type of
seller at which they attempt to trade. This leads to a joint distribution G(p;x;y) over feasible prices
and buyer and seller types. Distribution G is permissible if its marginal over x coincides with B(x):
Individual rationality is captured by the requirement that the support of G only includes combinations
(p;x;y) with f(x;y)   p  0:
Matching Technology. Trade is imperfect in the sense that with positive probability an agent does
not meet the partner with the characteristics he is looking for and remains unable to trade. We
allow for a general formulation of a constant returns to scale matching technology to allocate buyers
to sellers. Let number of trades when  buyers and  sellers interact in a given submarket (p;y)
be given by the aggregate matching function M(;): Because of constant returns, we can write the
trading probabilities in terms of the ratio of buyers to sellers at each combination of price and seller
characteristic, denoted by (p;y): This is often referred to as the tightness or queue length in market
(p;y): We denote the probability that a seller is matched by m(). It is equal to M(;)=; and given
constant returns we write M(;)= = M(=;1) = m(): The probability that a buyer is matched is
M(;)= = m()= = q(), with the convention that q(0) = lim&0 q().
We require the following properties on the entire domain [0;1): (bounded functions) m() 
minf;1g; (strict derivatives) m0() > 0 and q0() < 0; (strict curvature) m00() < 0 and [1=q()]00 > 0;
(bounded derivatives) rst and second derivatives of m and q are bounded. These restrictions are
motivated by the micro foundations that underlie the matching process, some of which are illustrated in
the next paragraph. The requirement of bounded functions ensures that m and q are indeed probabilities
with values between zero and one. The requirement of strict derivatives ensures that it is easier for a
seller to match when the ratio of buyers to sellers is high. The opposite applies to the buyers. Strict
curvature of m ensures that the second order condition of the rm's maximization is satised. Strict
curvature of 1=q ensures that an increase in the sellers' matching probability m decreases the buyers'
matching probability more the higher the value of m:10 In Section 6 we discuss the importance of these
assumptions further.
9We introduce type-dependent preferences also for the seller in Section 5.
10We show this and some other equivalences in Lemma 10 in the Appendix B.
7Examples of Matching Technologies. One commonly used specication is the urn-ball matching
technology m1() = 1   e  (see e.g. Peters (1991), Shi (2001), Shimer (2005)). Variations of this
specication arise naturally. If a fraction 1    of all intended trades falls through we obtain m2() =
(1 e ). If a fraction 1  of the buyers gets lost on the way we have m3() = 1 e : Very dierent
matching specications arise for logarithmic matching where m4() = 1   ln(1 + e(1 )=(1 ))=ln(1 +
e1=(1 )); with  2 (0;1) or under telegraph line matching m5() = =(1   ) with  2 (0;1]:11
Examples m1 to m4 fulll all our conditions. For m5 only a weak version of the curvature of 1=q holds,
yet most of our analysis still applies as we describe below.
Equilibrium. We take the Walrasian approach to price setting. This approach rests on two assump-
tions on what agents believe about the tightness in each market. First, traders are supposed to hold
well-dened beliefs for every possible market, including those that have no trading in equilibrium, and
second, all agents hold the same beliefs about the queue length in each market. The former is equivalent
to the complete markets assumption in centralized Walrasian markets.
For the following equilibrium denition it is convenient to dene the expected utilities and prots
ux(p;y) = q((p;y))(f(x;y)   p) (1)
y(p) = m((p;y))p: (2)
We require optimality on the support of the distributions, where the support of some distribution F is
the closure of the set of points with the property that each of their neighborhoods has strictly positive
measure under F: We denote the support by a \hat", i.e. ^ F in this case. Moreover we require that the
queue lengths are consistent.
Denition 1 An equilibrium is a set of permissible distributions (F;G) such that there exists a queue
length function  : P  Y ! R+ that satises:
I. (Prot Maximization) 8(p;y) 2 ^ F : y(p)  y(p0) 8p0 2 P:
II. (Utility Maximization) 8(p;x;y) 2 ^ G : ux(p;y)  ux(p0;y0) 8(p0;y0) 2 P  Y:




(;)dF = G(p;x;y): (3)
11Matching probability m1 is based on the idea that buyers choose at random one of the sellers with the appropriate (p;y)
combination, in which case e
  reects the probability that a seller is not visited by any buyer. Matching probability m5
arises in models of monetary exchange along the lines of Kiyotaki and Wright (1993): agents who want to trade quality y
at price p choose an island where they get paired with some randomly chosen other agent (buyer or seller) with probability
. The probability of a buyer-seller match is s=(s + b) when s is the measure of sellers and b the measure of buyers. In
Section 5.1 we show that m5 is a special case of the CES matching function.
8Condition (I) states that the prot at prices at which sellers want to trade is weakly higher than
any other prot they could have achieved by setting a dierent price. Condition (II) states that buyers
attempt to trade with type y at price p only if this yields expected utility at least weakly as high as
if they had attempted to trade at any other seller-price combination. Condition (III) is a consistency
requirement that ensures that the queue length  indeed reects the ratio of buyers to sellers. The
right hand side species the \inow" of buyers that want to trade up to combination (p;y); while the
left hand side species the \outow" of buyers over the sellers that oer the combinations up to that
point. This requirement is the analogue of market clearing in competitive markets without frictions.
Note that buyers can always attempt trade at (0;y) and obtain weakly positive utilities, and sellers
obtain weakly positive prots at all non-negative prices. To reect that some buyers might not be
able to trade we have to allow  in the extended reals and specify q(1) = lim!1 q() and m(1) =
lim!1 m(); which are well dened as these functions are monotonic and bounded. To be able to
interpret the Consistency Condition (III) with queue lengths in the extended reals, we adopt the
convention that for any measurable set A with (p;y) = 1 for all (p;y) 2 A and
R





A dG(p;x;y): In particular, this allows buyers to apply to low prices
even if they are not oered by sellers. It leads to a zero probability of trade rather than violating market
clearing. We call buyer and seller types active if they obtain strictly positive utilities and prots in
equilibrium, and denote by x0 (y0) the supremum of the inactive buyer (seller) types.12
Discussion of the Complete Markets Assumption. As mentioned above, our equilibrium denition
entails the complete markets assumption. In our setup, each possible meeting place (p;y) constitutes
a separate market and we assume that agents form beliefs (p;y) about the conditions in all separate
markets, including those that are not active in equilibrium. Most work on competitive search mar-
kets assumes a particular restriction on the beliefs, the Market Utility (MU) Assumption (see e.g.,
Montgomery (1991), Moen (1997), Shi (2001), Shimer (2005)). The MU Assumption derives from a
sequential notion of market interaction in which sellers post prices and then buyers choose where to
trade. For homogeneous buyers Peters (1991, 1997b, 2000) and Burdett, Shi and Wright (2000) have
derived those beliefs corresponding to the MU Assumption as approximations obtained in limits of nite
equilibria. In the nite economy, deviations and o the equilibrium path beliefs are well-dened and
they coincide with that particular complete markets assumption in the limit.
The appropriate extension of the MU assumption to heterogeneous buyers might not be obvious,
especially since now some buyers might not be able to trade. We derive an extended MU formulation
in the following Lemma 1 from the principle of complete markets. This places our setup within the
literature and allows us to the tractability of the MU assumption.13 Let the Market Utility for buyer
12One can think of types x0 and y0 as the lowest active types. We dene it on the complement of the active types
because zero measure of low type sellers could be active without having a trading partner because Consistency (III) only
applies for positive measures. When all buyers are active, then x0 = x; and if all sellers are active y0 = y:
13The complete markets assumption can be motivated in many ways, one of which is sellers posting prices.
9x, U(x) = q((p;y))(f(x;y)   p); be the utility that buyers x get in equilibrium when they use their
equilibrium path trading strategy (p;x;y) 2 ^ G. Similarly, (y) = m((p;y))p is the Market Prot for
seller y along the equilibrium path (p;y) 2 ^ F. In Lemma 9 in the Appendix we show that U(x) and
(y) are continuous and weakly monotonic on the relevant domain. A buyer is indierent between
trading at any other (p;y) combination if he faced a queue length x such that
q(x(p;y))[f(x;y)   p] = U(x) (4)
whenever f(x;y)   p  U(x). For the special case of f(x;y)   p = U(x) = 0 dene x(p;y) = 1; and
for f(x;y)   p < U(x) dene x(p;y) = 0: We extend the MU assumption to heterogeneous buyers as
follows:14
Denition 2 A queue length function  fullls the Market Utility Assumption for given Market Utility
U() if (p;y) = supx2X x(p;y):
The following Lemma shows that any equilibrium with complete markets can be sustained by beliefs
that conform to our extended Market Utility Assumption. Since the MU assumption does not change
the set of equilibria, we will use it throughout the paper.
Lemma 1 Any equilibrium (F;G) supported by queue lengths (;) that induce expected utilities U()
is also an equilibrium under a queue lengths ~ (;) that conform to the MU assumption given U():
Proof. See Appendix A.
Assortative Matching. Our main focus is on the sorting of buyers and sellers. We dene a matching
 : X  Y as a correspondence that species for each buyer type x the set of all seller types with which
this buyer type trades. Some buyer types might not be able to trade, in which case (x) = ?. We
will refer to the equilibrium matching as : That is, (x) = fy 2 Yj(p;x;y) 2 ^ G and (p;y) 2 ^ F for
some price p 2 Pg: We are interested in the conditions on f(x;y) that induce sorting, i.e. that generate
a matching pattern  that is single-valued and strictly monotonic on (x0;x]: In such a case we can
treat  as a function on (x0;x]: If the function  is strictly increasing on (x0;x], then we say that it
exhibits positive assortative matching, if it is strictly decreasing, then we say that it exhibits negative
assortative matching.
Degrees of supermodularity. In the analysis we will use the following concepts:
14In models with only one homogeneous buyer type x, the Market Utility Assumption states that (p;y) = x(p;y);
with the interpretation that an individual seller does not change the buyers' Market Utility U(x) and therefore buyers visit
(p;y) until the resulting buyer-seller ratio makes them indierent to visiting one of the other (p;y) oers in the market.
In our environment this notion extends naturally by requiring that the buyer-seller ratio is determined by the buyers that










Figure 1: Degrees of supermodularity for two buyer and seller types. Solid circles: match values under positive assortative
matching. Solid squares: match values under negative assortative matching. Empty squares and circles: match values
after concave transformation.
Denition 3 The function f(x;y) is:




3. n-root-supermodular with coecient n 2 (1;1) if
n p
f is supermodular.
4. log-supermodular if log(f) is supermodular;







Supermodularity requires n = 1; and log-supermodularity requires n ! 1, and both can therefore
be interpreted as the extreme cases of n-root-supermodularity. From inspection of equation (5) it is
immediate that root-supermodularity is a weaker requirement than log-supermodularity.
As an illustration of these concepts, consider only the extreme types. Restricted to this set, su-
permodularity requires f(x;y) + f(x;y)  f(x;y) + f(x;y): That is, extreme matches are jointly more
valuable than cross-matches. By Jensen's inequality a concave transformation of the match value re-
duces the extreme values on the left of the inequality more than the intermediate values on the right,
11which makes it harder to sustain the inequality. This is illustrated in Figure 1, where the solid circles
represent the components on the left of the inequality and the solid squares represent the components
on the right without the transformation. The empty counterparts represent the values after the trans-
formation. The more concave the transformation, the more dicult it is to fulll the condition. Since
logf = g 
p
f with g(z) = 2logz; the logarithm is more concave than the square root.
4 The Main Results
The problem that a rm solves is to set prices in order to maximize prots, taking the queue length 




In equilibrium, buyers obtain some utility U(:), and since the equilibrium can be sustained under the




where x was dened in (4). For given (p;y), since U(x) is continuous it is easy to show that x(p;y)
is either continuous in x, or there exists x 2 X such that x(p;y) = 1: We can therefore write
(p;y) = maxx2X x(p;y): Now it is straightforward to see that maximizing (6) given (7) yields the




since for given price p the seller would always choose the buyer that gives him the maximal queue




s.t. q()[f(x;y)   p] = U(x):
After substitution for p, this yields
max
x2X;0
m()f(x;y)   U(x): (9)
Since the buyers' utility U() is increasing, it is dierentiable almost everywhere. By Consistency (III),
almost all of the active sellers trade in equilibrium with buyers in the interior of [x0;x] for which U is
dierentiable. Also, active sellers make strictly positive prots. For any such seller the necessary rst
order conditions are
m0()f(x;y)   U(x) = 0 (10)
q()fx(x;y)   U0(x) = 0: (11)
12Even if U(:) is not dierentiable, (10) describes the optimal queue length for seller y conditional on
trading with buyer type x: Let (x;y) be dened as the queue length that uniquely solves (10) given
U(x); i.e., it is the optimal queue length that a seller of type y would choose conditional on trading
with buyer type x: So formally  depends on U(): In the following we suppress this dependence, and
we also suppress the arguments (x;y) for easier readability. Then prots conditional on trading with






We are interested in positive assortative matching, and rst we consider the condition to sustain positive
assortative matching locally. This will be the case if the marginal increase in prots from trading with
a higher buyer type increases in the type of the seller. A necessary condition is that the induced prot
function ~  is locally supermodular.
Lemma 2 Consider some U() and some optimal choice (x;) for a seller type y, where (x;) is
characterized by the rst order conditions (10) and (11): Then
@2~ (x;y)










Likewise, the statement holds when all strict inequalities are reversed, and when the strict inequalities
are replaced by equalities.
Proof. At (x;) the prot ~ (x;y) coincides with the optimal prot (9). The derivative of prots with




where the indirect eect due to a change of the optimal queue length  is zero by the envelope






fy(x;y) + m()fxy(x;y); (15)








15Equivalently, one can dierentiate prot equation (12) and substitute the change in 
 obtained by implicit dieren-
tiation of (10).







Denote a() by the rst ratio on the right hand side of (16). Since q() =
m()
 , it follows that
q0() = 1








which establishes the lemma.
Since a() > 0; the Lemma shows that supermodularity of the induced prot function requires a
condition on the match surplus f that is stronger than supermodularity. It turns out that a() has a
natural interpretation.16
Lemma 3 a() is equal to the elasticity of substitution of the aggregate matching function M(;).
Proof. The elasticity of substitution of the aggregate matching function M(;) with  buyers and 






where M(;) = m(), M = m0(), M = m()   m0(), and  = =. Then, suppressing the












The main argument informally. To provide some intuition, we outline a brief graphical argument
why supermodularity per se is not enough to induce positive assortative matching.
Buyers care about the probability of matching reected by ; the price p; and the type of the seller y.
Their preferences in equation (1) are over a three-dimensional space (;p;y). For clarity of exposition,
in Figure 2 we project those preferences into a two-dimensional space (p;). The solid concave curves
on the left refer to the indierence curves for low buyer type x1 and high buyer type x2 when trading
with a low seller type y1. They exhibit single crossing because high valuation buyers value fast trade
more, and are therefore willing to pay a higher price to avoid no-trade. The dotted curves on the right
represent the same level of utility for the buyers when they match with a higher buyer type y2 > y1.
The thick dotted curves represent the case without complementarities, e.g. when f(x;y) = x + y;










Figure 2: Explanation why sucient supermodularity is required for PAM. Solid concave curves: Buyers' indierence
curves when trading with seller y1. Thick dotted concave curves: Buyers' indierence when trading with a higher seller
type y2 if the match value has no complementarities. Thin dotted concave curve: High type buyers' indierence curve
when trading with high seller type y2 if the match value has complementarities. Convex curves: Sellers' indierence curves.
while the thin dotted curves represent the case with complementarities. For the latter, the match value
increases more for high buyer types when they trade with higher seller types. For a given buyer x;
the solid and dotted curves give the same level of utility. This means that along a horizontal line,
f(x;y)   p stays constant, which implies a parallel shift of the indierence curve for each x: That shift
is proportional to the change in the valuation from an increase in y: fy(x;y): Moreover, in the absence
of complementarities; the change fy is the same for dierent x; since fxy = 0: As a result, in that case
the curves for dierent buyer types shift by the same amount, as shown by the thick dotted curves.
One can think of an individual seller's problem as taking the utility of the buyers as given and
choosing the point that yields the highest iso-prot curve (red convex curves). We have drawn the case
where seller type y1 is indierent between trading with either buyer. To the right is another iso-prot
curve, corresponding to a higher type seller. Since a higher seller type induces higher utility for buyers,
he attracts more buyers and therefore obtains higher prots. Because at higher prices and same  a
seller is less willing to reduce the price, higher iso-prot curves are atter at each : The convex curve
on the right is therefore not a parallel shift. For the case without complementarities this implies that
the highest utility for a type y2 seller can be achieved when trading with the low seller type x1. There
15is negative assortative matching as high types match with low types and vice versa. Observe that in
a frictionless environment, the allocation is indeterminate in the absence of complementarities. The
market frictions therefore generate a force that leads to negative sorting.
When there is supermodularity in f(x;y); the change fy is larger for larger x since fxy > 0. There-
fore, because the shift in the indierence curves is proportional to fy; buyer type x2's indierence curve
will shift more than that of x1. In Figure 2, the thin dotted line to the right is x2's indierence curve
in an economy with complementarities. It is moved more than the indierence curve for type x1; which
for simplicity we left unchanged. Only if f(x;y) is suciently supermodular will the indierence curve
for the high buyer type shift enough to intersect with the iso-prot curve that is illustrated for y2.
Then the high type sellers are better o by trading with the high buyer types, which leads to Positive
Assortative Matching. The condition that induces such a large enough shift is root-supermodularity,
as we lay out next.
For the interpretation of why the condition for positive assortative matching requires the expression
a(), consider as a starting point equation (12): For a given (x;y) combination in isolation, equation
(12) relates the rm's prot to the match value and the change of the aggregate matching function
M(;) with respect to the number of sellers. If additional sellers incentives to enter this specic (x;y)
combination reect the contribution to match creation. With two-sided heterogeneity and assortative
matching, what matters is the relationship between dierent (x;y) combinations. At each market (x;y),
there is competition from potential entrants from nearby markets. Because increased trade in a market
can be achieved by entry of both sellers and buyers from nearby markets, the elasticity of substitution
becomes relevant.
A clear interpretation of our condition for assortative matching in terms of the trading motives
mentioned in the introduction can be gained by rewriting the condition (suppressing the arguments)
as fxy   a()fxfy=f > 0: The term fxy captures the Beckerian gain in \match value" due to comple-
mentarity. It reects the marginal increase in output from increasing both x and y types. The term
a()fxfy=f captures the opportunity costs induced by not trading, i.e., the \trading security" aspect
mentioned in the introduction. It consists of the marginal loss of value from matching a higher type
on each side multiplied by the rate of change in the number of matches. Only when the \match value"
motive outweighs the costs induced by the \trading security" motive does positive assortative matching
arise.
4.1 Positive Assortative Matching under Root-Supermodularity
We now state and prove our main result.
Theorem 1 There is Positive Assortative Matching of  for all permissible distributions B(x);S(y)
if and only if the function f(x;y) is root-supermodular.
16We will prove the theorem by means of two Propositions, one for the sucient part, one for the
necessary part. Each Proposition is preceded by a Lemma. The rst Lemma provides the justication
for the \root" in the supermodularity condition. With the aid of this Lemma, the rst Proposition
establishes that f is root-supermodular when we have Positive Assortative Matching for all type dis-





If this inequality is fullled, equilibrium behavior is such that high buyer types gain more by moving
towards higher seller types, and therefore positive assortative matching results.
The properties of the function a() are key to understanding condition (18). Because distributions
B and S can be suitably chosen, this condition must hold for all possible  2 R+. Even at zero, a() is
well dened, since q(0) > 0 and m00(0) < 0 and the derivatives are bounded. It turns out that at  = 0,
the function has a property that holds for any matching function in the class that we consider, namely
a(0) = 1=2:
Lemma 4 Under any permissible matching function a(0) = 1=2:
Proof. Constant returns to matching implies q() = m(); which readily yields after some rear-
ranging that q0() =
m0() q()
 and q00() =
m00() 2q0()
 : Our class of matching functions also assumes
boundedness of rst and second derivatives of q: Together this implies m0(0) = q(0) and m00(0) = 2q0(0),














We are now in a position to prove
Proposition 1 (Necessary) If there is Positive Assortative Matching of  for all permissible distri-
butions B(x) and S(y); then f(x;y) is root-supermodular.
Proof. See Appendix A.
We proceed to establishing suciency of root-supermodularity for Positive Assortative Matching.
We know that at a queue length of zero, a(0) = 1=2: For root-supermodularity to have enough bite to
sustain positive sorting we need a() to remain small enough for all queue lengths. That is established
in the next Lemma.
17Lemma 5 a() < 1=2 for all  2 R++ if and only if q() 1 is strictly convex in .
Proof. Since 1
q() = 
m(), we have (=m())0 = 1
m()2[m()   m0()]: Therefore [for brevity we
suppress the argument of m] :
(=m)00 =
1
m4[m0m2   m0m2   m00m2   2mm0(m   m0)]
=
1








2: The left hand
side of the inequality is a():
Lemma 5 provides a necessary and sucient condition for a() to be strictly less than 1=2: Together
with Lemma 2 this establishes that root-supermodularity is sucient for Positive Assortative Matching.
The reason why the proof is more than a corollary has to do with the assumption of dierentiability of
U(:); and with the fact that we also want to rule out global deviation of the form that the lower half of
the seller types trades with the higher buyer types while the upper half of the seller types trades with
the lower buyer types. Lemma 2 only considers the local incentives for assortative matching.
Proposition 2 (Sucient) If the function f(x;y) is root-supermodular then there is Positive Assorta-
tive Matching of  for all permissible distributions B(x);S(y):
Proof. See Appendix A.
We briey remark here that we either need a() < 1=2 and root-supermodularity, or a()  1=2 and
a strict form of root-supermodularity in order to guarantee positive assortative matching. Recall that for
one of the matching functions we featured as an example, m4 = =(1 ), the term q() 1 = =m() =
(1   )= is only weakly convex and therefore a() = 1=2 for all . Under strict supermodularity




f(x;y) for all (x;y) then any matching pattern can be sustained.
Finally, the next Corollary follows immediately from Proposition 2.
Corollary 1 If f(x;y) is log-supermodular then the matching pattern exhibits positive assortative match-
ing.
4.2 Negative Assortative Matching under Weak Submodularity
While \strong enough" supermodularity is needed for positive assortative matching, we now show that
negative assortative matching obtains under weak submodularity, i.e. fxy(x;y)  0. In the informal
18graphical argument of Figure 2, we argue that even under a-modularity (e.g. f(x;y) = x + y) there
is negative assortative matching. While in the frictionless world the equilibrium allocation under a-
modularity is indeterminate, the market frictions impose a force towards negative assortative matching.
In this sense, there is an asymmetry between positive and negative sorting as there is no need for
\strong" submodularity. There is no such asymmetry for example under random search (Shimer and
Smith (2000)), as negative assortative matching obtains provided f(x;y) is log-submodular.
We now establish the Theorem with a sucient condition for Negative Assortative Matching.
Theorem 2 There is Negative Assortative Matching of  for all permissible type distributions if the
function f(x;y) is weakly submodular.
Proof. By Lemma 2 the condition that implies negative assortative matching locally is fxy(x;y) <
a()
fy(x;y)fx(x;y)
f(x;y) ; where the right-hand side is always positive. Weak submodularity of f(x;y) requires
fxy  0; implying this is always satised. The global argument for negative assortative matching follows
along the same lines as in Proposition 2.
Weak submodularity is also necessary for Negative Assortative Matching for all type distribution
under some matching functions such as m1 to m3: These functions have the minimal a() at a(1) = 0;
and for buyer types that have a hard time trading the condition becomes binding. Similar to Proposition
1, for these matching functions there always exist distributions such that at a given (x;y) combination,
(x;y) goes to innity. By a similar argument one can show that if amin  inf a() > 0, then there is
Negative Assortative Matching for all type distributions if and only if the match value function f(x;y)
is nowhere 1
1 amin-root-supermodular. Recall that 1-root-supermodularity is standard supermodularity.
Interestingly, it is possible for specic distributions to have negative assortative matching for moder-
ate degrees of supermodularity even if amin = 0. To see this, refer back to the initial informal graphical
argument of Figure 2. Let there be a very small degree of supermodularity, say f(x;y) = x+y+"xy+1;
with " small. Then the thick dotted indierence curves representing the case without complementarities
will only be slightly to the left of the thin indierence curve representing the case with complemen-
tarities. Provided the distributions are such that a() is nowhere zero, the iso-prot curve for y2 will
be atter everywhere and it is more protable for high seller types to match with low buyer types.
Therefore, the equilibrium allocation exhibits negative assortative matching.
Proposition 3 There exist distributions B(x);S(y) and supermodular functions f(x;y) such that in
equilibrium only Negative Assortative Matching of  can obtain.
Proof. Fix the matching function m: Consider for example a sequence of supermodular functions of the
form fn(x;y) = x+y+"nxy+1; with "n > 0 and "n ! 0: Consider a sequence of distributions Bn and Sn
with support on [0;"n] and a unit measure of sellers for all n 2 N: For n ! 1 the maximal equilibrium
19utility maxx2[0;"n] Un(x) in any equilibrium remains bounded below 1    for some  > 0. To see this,
note that the equilibrium utilities of buyers converge, i.e. maxx2[0;"n] Un(x)   minx2[0;"n] Un(x) ! 0;
because the support converges and types can \mimic" each others' strategy. Since the match value f
converges to 1, a maximum utility converging to 1 is only possible if all buyer types get matched with
probability converging to unity, which is not possible with equal numbers of buyers and sellers. Since
maxx2[0;"n] Un(x)  1    for all n large enough, the optimal queue length 
n(x;y) remains bounded
below some . That means that min(x;y)2[0;"n]2 a(
n(x;y)) remains bounded above some a > 0 in any





holds for all (x;y) 2 [0;"n]2 when "n < a=[1 + 2"n + "3
n]; which holds for some n large. Therefore, only
negative assortative matching can be sustained.
For completeness, we state the analogue for Positive Assortative Matching.
Proposition 4 There exist distributions B(x);S(y) and functions f(x;y) that are not root-supermodular
such that there is Positive Assortative Matching of :
Proof. See Appendix A.
Our results are cast in terms of the monotonicity of the allocation, i.e., assortative matching. The
model provides few general predictions in terms of monotonicity of the price schedule. In particular,
sellers can be rewarded both through higher prices or better trading probabilities, and if the second eect
is large then prices at better sellers can actually fall. Under Negative Assortative Matching (NAM) the
trading probabilities for higher types are always higher, which is precisely the reason why high seller
types match with low buyer types. In this case prices can both increase or decrease in type, depending
on how much better the trading probabilities for high seller types are. Under Positive Assortative
Matching the trading probabilities for better seller types might increase or decrease, depending on the
relative density in the distribution of seller and buyer types. It increases when the seller types are more
dispersed and decreases otherwise, and only in the former case can prices rise.17
4.3 Existence
We now establish existence of equilibrium. Existence in our setup is more complicated than in friction-
less matching models because we cannot employ the standard measure consistency condition. There can
be more agents from one side attempting to trade with the other, because this imbalance is absorbed
17Formally, by more dispersed we mean that the support of the distribution of buyer types is very small relative to that
of seller types. In this case the derivative 
0(x) of the assignment is large, and it is easy to see from equation (29) in
the next section that in this case the ratio of buyers and sellers is falling in markets where the higher types trade [this is
ensured because  q() is bounded by q()]:
20through dierent trading probabilities.18 The system retains tractability when we impose the sucient
conditions for assortative matching, in which case the following constructive existence proof can be
applied.
Proposition 5 If the function f(x;y) is root-supermodular, there exists an equilibrium for all permis-
sible distributions B(x);S(y):
Our strategy of proof is the following: 1. we construct an equilibrium that is monotonically in-
creasing (PAM); 2. we show that the solution to the First Order Conditions satises a system of two
dierential equations in  and  with the appropriate boundary conditions; 3. we verify the Second
Order Condition for seller optimality along the equilibrium allocation  and verify that under root-
supermodularity the solution is indeed a local maximum; 4. we consider solutions to the First Order
Conditions dierent from the constructed equilibrium and nd that none other exist, thus establishing
that the solution is a global maximum.
Proof. Under assortative matching the matching  is unique and we can treat it as a function.
Therefore, the equilibrium is characterized by an assignment function (x) 2 Y [ ; that species the
type of seller to which buyer x is matched, where (x) = ; means that the buyer is not matched, as
well as a queue length function (x;(x)) =: ~ (x) along the equilibrium matching. We will construct
both in the following. The queue length o the equilibrium matching are then determined according to
the Market Utility Assumption. If y 2 Y but y = 2 (X) then the seller is not matched to any buyer. We
are looking for an assignment function with 0(x) > 0 for all x > x0; where x0 is the lowest buyer type




m()f(x;y)   U(x) (19)
and the solution for almost all types y > y0 is given by the rst order conditions
m0()f(x;y)   U(x) = 0 (20)
m()fx(x;y)   U0(x) = 0: (21)
18Even when we reinterpret our framework as a \many-to-many" matching where in a given market nb buyers match
with ns sellers to produce m(
nb
ns)f units of output per seller, we cannot apply standard results because the queue length
 =
nb
ns can be any real number and we will have to allow non-nite coalitions which is typically excluded in the literature.
Nor can we apply results from the extensive mathematical theory of optimal transportation that followed Kantorovich
(1942), because it imposes that the output per seller depends only on the types, but in our case the induced output m(
nb
ns)f
depends directly on the assigned measures. Therefore we cannot apply standard linear programming techniques, which is
precisely one of the main distinguishing features of our work from standard non-frictional assignment literature, for which
it is well-known that the core can be represented as a linear program (see e.g. Shapley and Shubik (1971)).
19We dened x0 as the supremum inactive type, which by Lemma (9) is the inmum of the active types. A similar point
applies to y0 when we apply the MU assumption.
21We immediately have the following necessary conditions for an equilibrium
m0(~ (x))f(x;(x)) = U(x) (22)
q(~ (x))fx(x;(x)) = U0(x): (23)
Moreover, for the boundary types it has to hold by (10) that
U(x0) = m0(~ (x0))f(x0;(x0))  0; with equality if x0 > x; (24)
and by (12) that
((x0)) = [m(~ (x0))   ~ (x0)m0(~ (x0))]f(x0;(x0))  0; with equality if (x0) > y: (25)









dx; for all x  x0: (26)






An equilibrium is a solution to (22) { (25) and (27). Totally dierentiating (22) yields










= q(~ (x))fx(x;(x)) (28)
which after rearranging and using the fact that  q0() = q()   m0() gives




~ (x)q0(~ (x))fx(x;(x)) + 0(x)m0(~ (x))fy(x;(x))
i
: (29)
Together with (27) we have










Equations (27) and (30) together constitute a dierential equation system in ~ ;. One initial condition
is (x) = y: Given a second initial condition ~ (x) =  2 (0;1) the system is uniquely dened (in
the direction of lower x) down to some limit point x0() where either x0() = x or (x0()) = y or
limx&x0() ~ (x) = ~ (x0()) = 0 or limx&x0() ~ (x) = ~ (x0()) = 1; whichever comes rst. In the latter
cases let (x0()) = limx&x0() (x): In the Appendix we prove that
22Lemma 6 There exists an initial condition  2 (0;1) such that resulting x0(), ~ (x0()) and (x0())
fulll boundary conditions (24) and (25).
We now check that no agent has an incentive to deviate under the assignment ~ (x), (x) that we
just constructed. If we can verify that the sellers have no protable deviation, then their optimization
problem (19) implies that buyers do not have a protable deviation either because the sellers would
have exploited it for their benet. (One can formally show that (30) is exactly the workers envelop
condition.) For the sellers we only have to consider types in [y0();y]: If there are seller types below
y0(), these types do not have a protable deviation because by boundary condition (25) y0() makes
zero prots and does not have a protable deviation despite being a higher type. To check optimality
for sellers, we will rst check whether the second order condition for rms holds along the equilibrium
path. The Hessian of (20) and (21) is:
 
m00()f(x;y) m0()fx(x;y)   U0(x)
m0()fx(x;y)   U0(x) m()fxx(x;y)   U00(x)
!
:














  [m0()   q()]2fx(x;y)2 > 0: (31)
Dierentiating (23) we get an expression for U00(x)
U00(x) = q0(~ (x))fx(x;(x))~ 0(x) + q(~ (x))fxx(x;(x)) + q(~ (x))fxy(x;(x))0(x);
which inserted in (31) and after rearranging yields along the path




where we used m() = q(), q0() = m0()   q() and we changed the sign of the inequality after










The square bracket is negative if






m00()q(), which is fullled when f is root-supermodular. We started from the premise
that 0(x) > 0, and as a result, under root-supermodularity and strict convexity of q 1 the Hessian is
negative denite. The solution to the FOC therefore constitutes a local maximum.
23We now establish that the solution is a global maximum. Consider a rm y that is matched to x,
i.e. y = (x). Now suppose there is also another partner ~ x, dierent from  1(y), that satises the
First Order Conditions for optimality. In particular, ~ x solves
q((~ x;y))fx(~ x;y)   U0(~ x) = 0; (32)
where (x;y) is the optimal queue length, dened implicitly by (11).
Suppose that ~ x >  1(y) which implies (~ x) > y { the opposite case is analogous. Since (~ x) is
matched with ~ x their FOC is satised by construction:
q((~ x;(~ x)))fx(~ x;(~ x))   U0(~ x) = 0: (33)
We rule out that both (32) and (33) are satised simultaneously by showing that the FOC is strictly
increasing when y increases for given ~ x. Dierentiating q((~ x;y))fx(~ x;y)   U0(~ x) with respect to y
yields











Therefore, (34) is strictly positive if




which is ensured by root-supermodularity since a() < 1=2 by Lemma 5. This implies that the solution
to the FOC in (22) and (23) is a global maximum.
A similar proof can be applied in the case where negative assortative matching is ensured, for
example when f is weakly submodular.
5 Extensions and Robustness
In this section we consider some extensions to our framework. We investigate the impact of broadening
the class of matching functions, we analyze sorting in a dynamic framework, and we introduce more
general payo structures.
5.1 Broader Classes of Matching Functions
Our setup provides sharp results for a large class of matching functions. Here we briey consider the
eect of relaxing some of the assumptions that we imposed. We do not attempt to relax the assumption
24of constant returns to scale, though. This assumption, which is pervasive in the search literature, is
crucial to all directed and competitive search models that we are aware of because the market size in
these models is endogenous as each (p;y) combination is essentially its own market.
We have considered matching functions with 1=q strictly convex. In contrast to the other assump-
tions on strict derivatives, strict curvature and boundedness this assumption is less pervasive in the
literature, even though it is common to the directed search literature. If we relax this assumption we
lose the suciency of root-supermodularity for positive assortative matching. When we replace this as-
sumption by the weaker assumption that the elasticity of the matching function m is strictly decreasing
we can still obtain an upper bound on a() of unity:
Lemma 7 If 0
m() < 0 then a() < 1:
Proof. See Appendix A.
Therefore, Corollary 1 still applies as log-supermodularity clearly suces for Positive Assortative
Matching. How far a() is bounded below unity depends on the exact nature of the matching function.
In general some level of n root-supermodularity with coecient n between 2 and 1 will be sucient
to induce Positive Assortative Matching.
Finally, we have assumed that the rst and second derivatives of the matching functions are strict at
 = 0: This condition was important for the necessity of root-supermodularity for positive assortative
matching. Without this assumption our approach20 of assessing the value of a() at a queue length of
zero would not be valid, and possibly dierent limit values a(0) could be achieved.
CES. The matching function that is not included in our framework is the Constant Elasticity of Sub-
stitution (CES) matching function. The aggregate CES matching function in a discrete time framework
for a given number of buyers and sellers  and  is dened as:
M(;) = (r + kr) 1=r
where r > 0 and k > 1. The elasticity of substitution is given by e = 1
1+r. Given constant returns to
matching, we can derive the individual matching probability expressed in function of the ratio  = =
from the aggregate matching function and where m() = M(;). Then:
m() = (1 + k r) 1=r:
We know from Lemma 3 that the expression for a() =  
m0(m m0)
m00m is equal to the elasticity of
substitution e = 1
1+r. We can easily verify that this is the case after substituting for m;m0 and m00.
The CES matching function does not fulll our conditions of boundedness and strict derivatives for
 = 0. When r < 1 both m00 and q0 converge to -1 when  approaches zero. Also, 1=q is not convex
20In particular, the proof of Lemma 4.
25for all r. When r > 1 then both m00 and q0 attain zero at  = 0 and are not strict. Nonetheless, the
ratio of the two in a() remains bounded. The knife-edge case is when r = 1, which corresponds to (a
variation of) the telegraph matching function m5 = 
+k. Only in this case are the derivatives m00 and
q0 bounded at zero.
To our knowledge, all micro founded matching functions involve bounded and strict derivatives. The
notion being that the marginal change in the matching probability is not innite or zero. Given that
the CES matching function satises the Inada conditions, there are either innite or zero returns to
matching for the buyers when the buyer to seller ratio is zero, which is typically not derived from micro
foundations. Nonetheless, the CES function is a convenient modeling tool, and it turns out that it gives
very sharp predictions on the necessary and sucient conditions for Positive and Negative Assortative
Matching. This may prove useful for applications.
Proposition 6 Let the matching function be CES with elasticity e. Then a necessary and sucient
condition for Positive Assortative Matching is that f(x;y) is n-root-supermodular where n = 1
1 e.
Proof. >From Lemma 2, along the equilibrium path a necessary and sucient condition is that fxy >
a()
fxfy
f . Since from Lemma 3, a() is equal to the elasticity of substitution and therefore constant
for CES, this condition is equivalent to fxy > e
fxfy
f and independent of the distribution. By denition,
f(x;y) is n-root-supermodular if fxy > n 1
n
fxfy
f , therefore n 1
n = e implies n = 1
1 e.
It is important to stress that with constant a() the result holds independent of which distribution
is chosen. The next Proposition immediately follows (the proof is omitted):
Proposition 7 Let the matching function be CES with elasticity e. Then a necessary and sucient
condition for Negative Assortative Matching is that f(x;y) is nowhere n-root-supermodular where n =
1
1 e.
What makes this result for the CES matching function particularly tractable is that the condition
holds everywhere independent of the buyer-seller ratio. That implies that there is no gap between the
range of match value functions f(x;y) for which PAM is satised and the range where NAM is satised.
No matter what the distribution of types is, if f satises the n-root-supermodularity condition, then
there is PAM; if it holds nowhere, then there is NAM. These Propositions are thus a counterpart to
Theorems 1 and 2 but with a much sharper prediction. Moreover, since Proposition 7 ensures NAM
for any given distribution, it also provides a stronger counterpart for our result in Proposition 4 which
establishes that there can be NAM even if the match value function exhibits moderate degrees of
supermodularity. With CES this is independent of the distribution.
The class of CES matching functions spans the entire range of n-root-supermodularity, from super-
modularity to log-supermodularity.
26Corollary 2 Let the matching function be CES with elasticity e. Then a necessary and sucient
condition for PAM is:
1. Supermodularity if e = 0 (Leontief);
2. Root-supermodularity if e = 1
2 (Telegraph Line Matching);
3. Log-supermodularity if e = 1 (Cobb-Douglas)
5.2 Sorting in a Dynamic Framework
The frictions that arise in directed search models are often justied by the cost of delay that arises
from miscoordination. Like much of this literature, we have chosen to cast our model in a static form,
thereby interpreting the possibility of no trade as a stark form of delay. Since it has not been our
intention to derive results on uctuations or dynamic comparisons, we have thus obtained our results
without the additional machinery and notation of a dynamic setting and thereby not unduly distracted
attention from the main economic issues.
In this section, we show that all the insights on assortative matching apply also in a dynamic
framework with a stationary equilibrium. We rst derive the equivalent of our main result on Positive
Assortative Matching in a dynamic framework. In Section 6 we use the dynamic framework to discuss
the consequences when frictions vanish.
Consider an economy with discrete time and an innite time horizon. Agents discount the future
with factor  2 (0;1). When an agent trades he is removed from the market, and for simplicity we
assume that he is replaced by a new agent of identical type.21 Therefore, distributions B(x) and S(y)
are stationary by assumption. When the trading strategies and the queue lengths are stationary, a
seller of type y who wants to trade at price p in one period would be willing to do so in all periods.
Therefore his expected discounted life-time prot from attempting to trade at p is recursively given by
y(p) = m((p;y))p +  (1   m((p;y)))y(p)
, y(p) =
m((p;y))
1    (1   m((p;y)))
p: (35)
21When agents who leave the market are replaced by an identical type (often referred to as the \cloning" assumption),
the logic of our existence proof extends to the dynamic version with suitably adjusted payos. In contrast, when there is
an endogenous distribution of types, our constructive proof would have to keep track also of the speed with which the stock
of agents of each type adjusts over time. It is well known in models of random search (see for example Shimer and Smith
(2000) and Burdett and Coles (1997)) that this substantially complicates proofs of existence. An endogenous pool would
not alter the characterization that we provide for positive assortative matching, though, because it is based on incentives
of an individual who takes the steady-state conditions (exogenous or endogenous) as given. With an endogenous type
distribution we would also require a probability that agents die between two periods to prevent unbounded accumulation
of agents who cannot trade and would adjust the discount factor appropriately:
27Similarly, the expected discounted life-time utility of a buyer of type x who attempts to trade at
combination (p;y) is given by
ux(p;y) = q((p;y))(f(x;y)   p) +  (1   q((p;y)))ux(p;y)
, ux(p;y) =
q((p;y))
1    (1   q((p;y)))
(f(x;y)   p) (36)
With these adjustments of the prot and utility, we can dene a stationary equilibrium exactly as in
Denition 1.
Again let U(x) be the Market Utility that buyers get in equilibrium, which again has to be increasing
and continuous in equilibrium. Similar steps as in the main body reveal that sellers maximize prots
as long as they promise the Market Utility to the buyer type they want to trade with. Again let ~ (x;y)
be the optimal prot of seller type y who trades with buyer type x; i.e. ~ (x;y) is determined by
max
2R+
m()[1    (1   m())]
 1 p (37)
s.t. q()[1    (1   q())]
 1 (f(x;y)   p) = U(x); (38)
and (x;y) is again the argument that solves this program. In equilibrium the seller chooses the
optimal x as well. We are interested in positive assortative matching, for which the crucial insight
arises from the analogue to Lemma 2:
Lemma 8 Consider an equilibrium with Market Utility U(): For a buyer type y who trades with seller
type x 2 (x;x) with U0(x) well dened at queue length  2 (0;1) the equilibrium expected prots
satisfy
@2~ (x;y)






[1    + q() + (1   )q0()][1   ]






Proof. See Appendix A.
Almost all active sellers make strictly positive prots, and U() increasing implies that it is dieren-
tiable almost everywhere. Therefore, the condition holds for almost all active sellers. For our purposes
the following results are important and can easily be veried.22
22To see part 1, observe that with q
0  0 and m  0; each of the factors in the numerator is smaller than the one of the
factors in the denominator: 1    + q() + (1   )q
0()  1    + q() and 1     1    + m().
28Corollary 3 It holds that
1. A(;) 2 [0;1] for all (;) 2 R+  [0;1);
2. lim!0 A(;) = 1 for all  2 [0;1);
3. lim!1 A(;) = 0 for all  > 0:
As a result, the product A(0;)a(0) = 1=2: Therefore, root-supermodularity is still the necessary
condition for Positive Assortative Matching because it is again necessary when  is close to zero.
Moreover, A(;)  1 guarantees that root-supermodularity is also sucient for Positive Assortative
Matching. We discuss the case of vanishing frictions  ! 1 in more detail in the discussion section.
5.3 More General Payo Structures
In the basic model we considered a setup in which buyers have private information about their type
and the benets of the match accrues only to them. We think that this setup is particularly relevant
in goods market contexts, and our analysis shows that in equilibrium sellers are able to dierentiate
between buyers who sort according to price. It is straightforward to augment our basic setup by allowing
sellers' payos to depend on their own type. That is, assume the same setup as in Section 3 but a seller
of type y obtains payo fs(y)+p that depends on the price and on his type.23 Therefore, his expected
payo is y(p) = m((p;y))[fs(y) + p]: Similar to the derivation that led to (9) we now arrive at an
optimization problem for the seller of type y
max
x2X;0
m()[f(x;y) + fs(y)]   U(x): (39)
Treating ^ f(x;y) = f(x;y) + fs(y) as the match value, our analysis carries over exactly as above.
Our results carry over even to a setup in which the buyer's type inuences the sellers payo, but
only if we give up the assumption that buyers' types are unobservable. If one interprets the buyer's type
as his productivity in a match with a seller, then in order to avoid \lemon" problems the price of the
seller has to condition on the buyer's type. For such an extension, we undertake the following changes
to our setup: The payo for a seller type y who matches with a buyer type x at price p is fs(x;y) + p;
and the sellers strategy F is a distribution function over P  X  Y. Also, the queue length depends
on the price and the seller type, but also on the buyer type, i.e., we consider (p;x;y).24 Expected
23Hoppe, Moldovanu and Sela (2008) consider unobservable seller types in a very dierent model. They analyze signalling
by sellers.
24The important feature is that the market conditions have to be contingent on all payo-relevant information for each
side of the market. If sellers' payos are not directly inuenced by the buyer's type, then  does not have to directly
depend on the buyer's type, and therefore the buyer's type can be private information as in our baseline specication.
A similar idea has recently been proposed by Mailath, Postlewaite and Samuelson (2006) for matching markets without
frictions.
29payos are then
ux(p;y) = q((p;x;y))(f(x;y)   p); (40)
y(p;x) = m((p;x;y))(fs(x;y)   p); (41)
and we arrive naturally at the following extended equilibrium denition
Denition 4 An equilibrium is a set of permissible distributions (F;G) such that there exists a queue
length function  : P  X  Y ! R+ such that:
1. (Prot Maximization) 8(p;x;y) 2 ^ F : y(p;x)  y(p0;x0) 8(p0;x0) 2 P  X:
2. (Utility Maximization) 8(p;x;y) 2 ^ G : ux(p;y)  ux(p0;y0) 8(p0;y0) 2 P  Y:




(;;)dF = G(p;x;y): (42)
For a given Market Utility U(x) the MU Assumption now requires that the queue length is given
by the indierence q((p;x;y))[f(x;y) p] = U(x) if f(x;y) p  U(x): Again this condition does not
have bite when f(x;y)   p = U(x) = 0; for which we dene (p;x;y) = 1: If f(x;y)   p < U(x) then
buyers would not like to trade, which is captured by (p;x;y) = 0: Under the market utility assumption,
similar steps to those in (6) to (9) lead to a maximization problem for the seller of type y:
max
x2X;0
m()[f(x;y) + fs(x;y)]   U(x): (43)
Because of this structure, all our subsequent derivations carry over using the joint match value ^ f(x;y) =
f(x;y) + fs(x;y):
6 Discussion
The main interest of this paper has been to provide a characterization of the patterns of sorting in a
world with non-neglegible frictions. Nonetheless, a common theme in the literature is to investigate
whether those economies converge to the Walrasian outcome as frictions vanish. In the context of the
dynamic version of our model, we can investigate whether the limit with vanishing discounting frictions
converges to the competitive allocation. This is the approach taken in the large literature on sequential
bargaining and competition (see amongst many others Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), Gale (1986)
and recently Lauermann (2007)). Alternatively, even in the static economy we can consider matching
functions that embody relatively little frictions, and consider sequences of those functions that converge
30to the frictionless case as in Becker (1973). Here, we will consider each case in turn, starting with the
limit of the dynamic economy.
For our purposes, the question is whether in the competitive limit we can reconcile the fact that
root-supermodularity is the requirement for Positive Assortative Matching in the model with frictions,
with the fact that in the frictionless model (Becker 1973) that requirement is mere supermodularity.
The limit of the dynamic economy with vanishing frictions. In the dynamic version of our
model, the requirement for Positive Assortative Matching is
fxyf  A(;)a()fxfy;
where the strength of the condition depends on the value of A(;)a(): From Corollary 3, for given




Therefore, whenever all sellers can trade with non-negligible probability, simple supermodularity is
sucient to obtain Positive Assortative Matching with very patient players. In those dynamic markets
with supermodular match value functions, the standard condition by Becker applies for the allocation
of types.
Nevertheless, root-supermodularity remains a stringent requirement to guarantee Positive Assor-
tative Matching for all active agents even when players are long-lived and become innitely patient.
It remains binding in economies where some buyers cannot trade due to uneven market sides. In







Therefore if some sellers remain without trading opportunities, root-supermodularity is necessary to
achieve Positive Assortative Matching of those seller types with small trading probabilities. The intu-
ition why root-supermodularity remains important is immediate: If some sellers cannot trade, then even
with very high discount factors those sellers who are close to not being able to trade face increasingly
long waiting times that outweigh even high levels of patience.
The limit of the static economy with vanishing frictions. Our condition for positive assortative
matching depends on the properties of the general matching function m because it denes a(): A fric-
tionless model  a la Becker can be represented by the frictionless matching function mB() = minf;1g
indicating that when sellers are on the long side of the market ( < 1), a match for the sellers realizes
with probability  while buyers trade with probability 1. When sellers are on the short side ( > 1),
a match for the sellers realizes with probability 1: This frictionless matching probability is weakly






Figure 3: Vanishing Frictions for the Static Matching Function
In our setup we require smoothness of the matching function. In particular we require m to be
strictly increasing and strictly convex. We can nonetheless consider the limit of a sequence of matching
functions that converges to mB as illustrated in Figure 3. For example, in the case of the logarithmic
matching function m4() = 1   ln(1 + e(1 )=(1 ))=ln(1 + e1=(1 )) with  2 (0;1) it can readily be
shown that lim!1 m4() = minf;1g: Our condition for positive assortative matching
fxyf  a(;)fxfy
entails a factor a(;) that depends on  since the matching function depends on : The strength of
the condition depends on the value of a(;) : if it is zero, then PAM obtains under supermodularity,


















Since m4 fullls our assumptions for any  2 (0;1); we have
lim
!0
a(;) = 1=2 for all  2 (0;1);
and therefore root-supermodularity remains a necessary and sucient condition for Positive Assortative
Matching for any sequence of 's such that m4 ! mB pointwise.
This shows the robustness of our root-supermodularity condition. The condition arises from con-
sidering  ! 0: For given frictions { i.e., a given matching function { we need strong supermodularity
conditions for all queue length because a() > 0 for all  2 (0;1). With vanishing frictions the strength
of the root-supermodularity condition comes from the region where   0 only. That is, it arises only
when some sellers are not able to trade even when the frictions disappear, for example due to uneven
32market sides. If this is not the case, i.e., if all sellers can trade with probability bounded away from zero
along a sequence of 's such that m4 ! mB; then the standard supermodularity condition of Becker's
frictionless analysis emerges. In particular, some tedious application of De l'H^ opital's rule reveals
lim
!1
a(;) = 0 for all  > 0:
Therefore, when the trading probability of all sellers remains bounded away from zero simple (strict)
supermodularity induces Positive Assortative Matching for  suciently large.
337 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A: Proofs
Lemma 9 In equilibrium U(x) is continuous, weakly increasing, and strictly increasing on (x0;x]. (y)
equals zero a.e. on [y;y0); and is strictly increasing and continuous on (y0;y].
Proof. Equilibrium condition (II) can be rewritten as maximizing (1) over (p;y) for given parameter
x and we can apply the envelope theorem. This implies continuity since f(x;y) is continuous. U(x)
is increasing since type x0 > x can trade at exactly the same (p;y) as type x; but f(x;y) is strictly
increasing. This relationship is strict when buyers make strictly positive prots.
For (y) the argument is more complicated as seller type y faces dierent queue length (p;y) than
a seller y0 that oers the same price. To prove the claim, assume that strictly increasing prots are
violated, i.e. there exist (p;y) and (p0;y0) in ^ F such that y > y0 > y0 but m((p;y))p  m((p0;y0))p0:
y > y0 implies 0 < m((p;y))p which implies that queue length and price are strictly positive. By
Prot Maximization m((p0;y))p0  m((p;y))p; and so m((p0;y))p0  m((p0;y0))p0; which in turn
implies (y;p0)  (y0;p0): But this violates Utility Maximization (II) for the buyer type x0 who trades
with (p0;y0); because x0 could trade with a better seller type at a weakly lower queue at equal price.
[Such a buyer type exists: Since (p0;y0) is in the support of F; any neighborhood of (p0;y0) has positive
measure under F: Since the rms make strictly positive prots in a neighborhood of y0 (by y0 > y0)
their queue lengths are strictly positive, so by Consistency (III) there has to exist x0 2 X such that
(p0;x0;y0) 2 ^ G:] A discontinuity in prots at type y compared to nearby types y0 can be ruled out by a
similar argument: (y;p0) must be discontinuously lower than (y0;p0) for nearby types, which makes
it strictly preferable for buyers to trade with type y:
Proof of Lemma 1:
Before proving the result, we briey lay out the intuition. For buyers almost any equilibrium
combination (p;x;y) 2 ^ G has a queue that delivers the Market Utility [where exceptions might be due
to inactive types], and therefore the queue lengths  and ~  coincide at almost all (p;y) in the support
of their trading strategy. By the denition of Market Utility no buyer type can obtain a utility larger
than U(:) in the market, and therefore Utility Maximization (II) holds. Since active sellers trade with
buyers, they have the same support and again  and ~  coincide at almost all (p;y) combinations in
^ F: Since the queue lengths coincide a.e. on the support, we have Consistency (III). Moreover, the
MU assumption leads to the lowest queue length that can support an equilibrium because any lower
queue would lead a buyer to deviate: ~ (p;y)  (p;y) holds a.e. for all (p;y): Therefore sellers have
less incentives under ~  to deviate from the equilibrium support than under  and Prot Maximization
(III) holds. The presence of inactive types implies the qualication of \almost everywhere", and the
main dicult of the proof is to show that the result applies everywhere.
34Proof. Consider a trading constellation (F;G) that satises equilibrium conditions (I) - (III) under
queue length function  and that yields equilibrium prots and utilities () and U(). We will show
that (F;G) also satises equilibrium conditions (I) - (III) under queue length function ~  conforming
to the MU Assumption. The proof is structured in a sequence of steps. Let G(p;y) = G(p;x;y) be the
marginal distribution over (p;y).
Step 1. a) We show: If U(x) = 0 for some x 2 X; then (y) > 0 8y 2 Y:
Proof: Assume U(x) = 0 for some x 2 X: Since f is strictly positive for any y 2 Y; there exists strictly
positive p 2 P such that f(x;y) p > 0: Then U(x) = 0 only if (p;y) = 1: But this implies (y) > 0.
b) We show: If (y) = 0 for some y 2 Y; then U(x) > 0 8x 2 X:
Proof: Assume (y) = 0 for some y 2 Y: By contradiction, assume there exists x 2 X such that
U(x) = 0: But since f(x;y)   p0 > 0 for some p0 > 0; we have to have (p0;y) = 1 and therefore
(y) > 0:
Step 2. a) Note that (y) > 0 8y 2 Y implies that ^ F  ^ G by Consistency (III) of the queue length
and the fact that all (p;y) 2 ^ F have strictly positive queue length by (y) > 0: Similarly, if U(x) > 0
for all x 2 X then ^ G  ^ F:
b) If (y) = 0 for some y 2 Y such a relationship still holds for rms with y > y0: Let F>y0 be
the distribution conditional on values being in f(p;y) 2 P  Yjy > y0g: It holds that ^ F>y0  ^ G again
by Consistency (III). Similarly, let G>x0 be the conditional distribution of G, conditional on x > x0:
Then ^ G>x0  ^ F:
Step 3. We show: (p;y)  ~ (p;y) 8(p;y); except possibly when U(x0) = 0 and (p;y) is such that
f(x0;y)   p = 0: [The latter possibility is a special case because any queue length at (p;y) yields type
x0 zero prots, and the queue length at (p;y) is not tied down by possible deviations of lower buyer
types as lower types nd the price unattractive at any queue length, nor it is necessarily tied down by
deviations by higher buyer types.]
Proof: Consider some (p;y) 2 P  Y.
Case 3.1: There exists x 2 X with f(x;y)   p  U(x) and U(x) > 0: Then (p;y)  ~ (p;y) as
otherwise q((p;y))[f(x;y)   p] > q(~ (p;y))[f(x;y)   p] = U(x); which means that Buyer Optimality
(II) is violated as the buyers equilibrium utility is lower than what he could have gotten by trading at
(p;y):
Case 3.2: There exists x 2 X with f(x;y)   p > 0 and U(x) = 0: For U(x) = 0 Buyer Optimality
(II) requires (p;y) = 1: Moreover x(p;y) = 1 and ~ (p;y)  x(p;y) by denition.
Case 3.3: There exists x 2 Xnfx0g with f(x;y)   p = 0 and U(x) = 0: By continuity of U(x) and
denition of x0 we have x < x0: But by fx > 0 there exists x0 2 (x;x0) such that f(x0;y)   p > 0 and
U(x0) = 0; which is Case 3.2.
35Case 3.4: For all x 2 X it holds that f(x0;y)   p < U(x): Then x(p;y) = 0 for all x 2 X and thus
~ (p;y) = 0; which is trivially weakly smaller than (p;y): This exhausts all cases.
Step 4. We show: If (p;x;y) 2 ^ G; then x(p;y) = ~ (p;y) = (p;y):
Proof: Consider some (p;x;y) 2 ^ G.
Case 4.1: U(x) = 0 and f(x;y)   p > 0: By Case 3.2 it holds that (p;y) = 1: Moreover, by
denition x(p;y) = 1; and ~ (p;y)  x(p;y) then yields ~ (p;y) = 1.
Case 4.2: U(x) = 0 and f(x;y)   p = 0 and x < x0: By Case 3.3 this reduces to Case 4.1.
Case 4.3: U(x) = 0 and f(x;y)   p = 0 and x = x0: We show that (p;y) = 1: By Step 2b)
^ G>x0  ^ F and therefore (by the closure property of the support and the fact that each type has zero
measure) ^ Gx0  ^ F: Therefore, there exists (p0;y0) 2 ^ F such that (p0;x0;y0) 2 ^ G: By Step 1a) we have
(y0) > 0; and by denition q((p0;y0))p0 = (y0): We know that at all prices p00 strictly below p0 it
holds that (p00;y0) = 1 for buyer type x0 to make zero utility. Therefore, (p0;y0) = 1, as otherwise
q((p0;y0))p0 < q((p00;y0))p00 = q(1)p00 for some p00 < p0, violating Prot Maximization (I).
Case 4.4: U(x) > 0: Since U(x) = q((p;y))[f(x;y) p] this uniquely identies (p;y) as a function of
U(x); and the same relationship determines x(p;y); yielding (p;y) = x(p;y): By denition, ~ (p;y) 
x(p;y): Moreover, by Step 3 (p;y)  ~ (p;y) 8(p;y); except possibly when U(x0) = 0 and (p;y) such
that f(x0;y)   p = 0:
If that exception is indeed present we know that x0(p;y) = ~ (p;y) = 1; and by a logic similar to
Case 4.1 we can show that (p;y) = 1; in which case the proof is complete. To see the latter note
that by Step 1a) the seller type y makes strictly positive prots and by Step 2a) (p;y) 2 ^ F: For p0 < p
we have (p0;y) = 1 for buyer type x0 to obtain zero utility, and therefore again (p;y) nite will
violate Prot Maximization (I) of seller type y as he will have a discrete jump in trading probability
by trading at p   " rather than at p if (p;y) nite.
Step 5: Checking Utility Maximization (II) under ~ :
By Step 4 for any (p;x;y) 2 ^ G the queue length ~ (p;y) and (p;y) coincide, and therefore the utility on
the equilibrium path is the same. There is no protable deviation for buyers because by construction
of ~ (p;y) no buyer can obtain a higher expected utility than U(x) under ~ (p;y):
Step 6: Checking Prot Maximization (I) under ~ :
Case 6.1: (y) > 0 8y 2 Y: By Step 2a) ^ F  ^ G; and therefore by Step 4 we have ~ (p;y) = (p;y)
for all (p;y) 2 ^ F: Therefore prots at these combinations are identical under either queue length. By
Step 3 at any other (p0;y) we have (p0;y)  ~ (p0;y) and therefore these \deviation" prices are even
less attractive under ~ .
The last argument does not apply to (p0;y) if f(x0;y)   p0 = 0 and U(x0) = 0: In this situation
~ (p0;y) = 1 and a deviation for the seller would be optimal if q(1)p0 > (y): Yet for any p00 < p
it holds that ~ (p00;y) = 1 [since f(x0;y)   p00 > 0 and U(x0) = 0]. If indeed q(1)p0 > (y); then
36q(1)p00 > (y) for p00 close enough to p0: Yet we have shown in the previous paragraph that p00 cannot
be a protable deviation.
Case 6.2: (~ y) = 0 for some ~ y 2 Y: Consider Prot Maximization (I) for some y 2 Y:
Sub-Case 6.2i) y > y0: By Step 2b) y 2 ^ F>y0  ^ G; and the argument follows Case 4.1.
Sub-Case 6.2ii) y < y0; or y = y0 and (y0) = 0: There exists y0 2 (y;y0] such that (y0) = 0 under
: Therefore (p;y0) = 0 8p > 0: By the combination of Step 1b) and Step 3 we also have ~ (p;y0) = 0
8p > 0: Since ~ (p;y0) is increasing in y; we have ~ (p;y) = 0 8p > 0: Therefore, type y makes zero prot
at any combination (p;y) and therefore Prot Maximization (I) is fullled.
Sub-Case 6.2iii) y = y0 > y and (y0) > 0: Because of the compactness of P  Y there exists
a sequence (pn;yn) 2 ^ Fy0 such that yn > y0 and limn!1 yn = y0 and such that limn!1 pn = p0;
where ^ Fy0 is the support of the conditional distribution of F conditional on combinations (p;y) with
y  y0: By Step 2b) ^ F>y0  ^ G; and by the closedness of the support also (p0;y0) 2 ^ Fy0  ^ G: But then
(p0;y0) 2 ^ F; and therefore (y0) > 0 implies (p0;y0) > 0: Yet for any " > 0 there exist y0 2 (y0 ";y0)
such that (p0;y0) = 0; and therefore the buyers trading (p0;y0)  ^ G would make higher utility trading
at (p0;y0): This violates Utility Maximization (II), and therefore this sub-case cannot arise when 
supports G in equilibrium.
Sub-Case 6.2iv) y = y0 = y but (y0) > 0: This coincides with Case 4.1.
Step 7: Checking Consistency (III) under ~ :
By Step 4 the queue lengths on ^ G are identical, and by Step 2 they are identical on ^ F>y0. On ^ F<y0 the
queue lengths are almost everywhere equal to zero under both  and ~ : Since queue lengths coincide
almost everywhere on the support F and G, Consistency (III) is fullled.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. Consider some match value function f that is not root-supermodular at some (^ x; ^ y): We will
show that there are distributions for which positive assortative matching cannot be an equilibrium
outcome. By the smoothness properties of f there exists " > 0 such that f is not root-supermodular
anywhere on Z" = [^ x "; ^ x+"][^ y "; ^ y+"]: In fact, " can be chosen such that fxy(x;y) 
fx(x;y)fy(x;y)
f(x;y) <
0 for all (x;y) 2 Z" for some  < 1=2: By the continuity of a() we can nd ^  such that a() >  for
all  2 [0; ^ ]: The proof is complete once we show that there are type distributions for which a positive
measure of seller types in [^ x   "; ^ x + "] trades with buyer types in [^ y   "; ^ y + "] at queues below ^ ,
because for some of these types their choices have to be characterized by their rst order conditions
and the condition for Positive Assortative Matching in Lemma 2 cannot be satised.
Consider a sequence f"ng1
n=1; 0 < "n < "; that monotonically converges to zero. Let Bn and Sn
be associated sequences of distributions of buyer and seller types. Let Bn be uniform with support
on [xn;  xn] = [^ x   "n; ^ x + "n] and unit mass: Bn(^ x + "n) = 1: Let Sn be uniform with support on
[y
n;  yn] = [^ y   "n; ^ y + "n] with mass Sn(^ y + "n) = 1
"n (observe that the mass is increasing in the
37sequence). By construction the buyer-seller pairs that match are within Z" for any n: We want to show
that for some n a strictly positive measure of sellers trade at a queue length in (0; ^ ): The remainder of
the proof has two parts. First, we show that the measure of sellers that trade at queues above ^  goes
to zero. Second, we show that the measure of sellers that trade at a queue above zero remains bounded
away from zero. This completes the proof.
We show the rst part by contradiction: Assume there exists a subsequence such that the measure of
sellers that trade at queue length above ^  is larger than some  > 0: Then, by Consistency (III); there
is a non-vanishing measure of buyers that trades with these sellers. These buyers make at most a utility
q(^ )f( xn;  yn); which converges to q(^ )f(^ x; ^ y): But then all sellers are able to ensure themselves prots
bounded away from zero: They can oer a price pn > 0 and queue length
^ 
2 that provides at least this
utility to buyers, for example by choosing pn such that even for the worst types q(
^ 
2)[f(xn;  xn)   pn] =
q(^ )f(^ x; ^ y): Such a strictly positive pn exists for n large since the support converges. Therefore, all
sellers could ensure themselves prots that are bounded from zero despite their increasing mass by the
MU assumption. But this requires a queue for all sellers that is bounded away from zero, which is not
possible because there are few buyers relative to sellers and Consistency (III) would be violated.
We show the second part also by contradiction: Assume that the measure of sellers who trade at
a strictly positive queue goes to zero. As the measure of active sellers becomes much smaller than
unity, the trading probability for some buyer types must go to zero, which implies that their Market
Utility goes down to zero. [Mathematically, Consistency (III) can only be satised when (p;y) goes
to innity for some (p;y) on the support of G(:;  x;:):] But then any seller can protably attract these
buyers by the MU assumption. Therefore, prots (and thus queue lengths) of all sellers remain bounded
away from zero, yielding a contradiction to the assumption.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. Strict convexity of 1=q is equivalent to a() < 1=2 when  > 0 from Lemma 5. Fix an
equilibrium with associated buyer utility U(:) and seller prot (:). We focus on active buyers as only
these are relevant for assortative matching. Almost all of these trade at an interior queue length in
[0;1], and therefore almost all of their trading partners are active sellers. [Seller types below y0 have
zero queue length a.e. as shown in the proof of the previous proposition.] We can therefore focus on
active seller types.
Given U() sellers solve maximization problem (9): For an active seller type y let My be the set of
buyer types who maximize his prots (when combined with the optimal queue length (x;y)). Since
the sellers' problem is continuous, maxMy and minMy exist.
We consider the global incentives for assortative matching by showing that y0 > y implies minMy0 
maxMy: This then implies minMy0 > maxMy { i.e. strictly positive assortative matching. Otherwise
all types (y0;y) have maxMy as their only maximizer, which implies zero prots for all these seller types
because by Consistency (III) their queue length is zero and violates that these sellers are active.
38To see the result, let ^ x = maxMy: To avoid discussions of dierentiability of the buyers' utility, we
will endow buyer types in [x; ^ x) with a hypothetical utility ~ U(x) such that (y) = max(x;) m()f(x;y) 
~ U(x): [Note that ~ U(x) might be negative for some types. Let  x be the lowest type with ~ U(x)  0:]
That means that under ~ U(x) seller type y is indierent between all x weakly below ^ x: Moreover, since
by construction U(x)  ~ U(x) all x in [ x; ^ x] are more attractive under utility ~ U(x) than under U(x) for
any seller type. Note that ~ U(x) is dierentiable by construction on [ x; ^ x]: Now we can apply Lemma 2
given ~ U(x); establishing that under root-supermodularity higher type strictly prefer ^ x over any type in
[ x; ^ x):
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof. Fix the matching function m: Consider for example a sequence of functions fn of the form
fn(x;y) = (x + y + 1)2   "n; with "n > 0 and "n ! 0: As in the proof of Proposition 3, consider the
sequence of distributions Bn and Sn with support on [0;"n] and a unit measure of sellers for all n 2 N:
This function is weakly root-supermodular in the limit but not for any nite n: By the same logic as
in Proposition 3 the buyers' utilities are bounded below 1    for some  > 0: This implies again
that the optimal queue length 
n(x;y) remains bounded below some . It also implies that prots are
bounded below by some  > 0 as an immediate consequence of the sellers' maximization problem (9).
Then then queue length 
n are bounded away below by some  > 0 for all (x;y): Since q 1 is strictly





@yfn(x;y)=f (x;y) holds when @2
@x@yfn(x;y) < a @
@xfn(x;y) @
@yfn(x;y)=f (x;y) for
all (x;y) 2 [0;"n]2; which holds for some n large. Therefore, only positive assortative matching can be
sustained.
Proof of Lemma 6:
Proof. Equations (27) and (30) together constitute a dierential equation system z0 = F(z;x) where
z0 = (0; ~ 0), z = (; ~ ) and F is dened by the right hand sides of equations (27) and (30). Let F1 be
the right hand side of (27) and F2 the right hand side of (30). Boundary conditions are (x) = y and
~ (x) =  2 (0;1): Since F is C1 on Y  (0;1)  X it is locally Lipschitz around the initial condition,
and a unique solution z(x) exists in some interval around the initial condition by Picard's existence
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and z(x;): Since F is continuous and locally Lipschitz on  2 Y; ~  2 (0;1) and x 2 X;








is continuous in  (De la Fuente (2000),
Theorem 6.20). Let R()  f(i);(ii);(iii);(iv)g be the subset of the conditions (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv)








;x] implies upper-hemicontinuity of R():
R() is non-empty because the dierential equation terminates latest because of (i). A necessary
condition for an equilibrium is that the dierential equation either pairs all buyers and sellers, i.e.
R() 2 ff(i);(ii)g;f(i);(ii);(iii)g;f(i);(ii);(iv)gg; or the sellers get rationed and the boundary seller
makes zero prots, i.e. R() = f(i);(iii)g; or the buyers get rationed and the boundary buyer makes
zero utility, i.e. R() = f(ii);(iv)g:25 The remaining part of the proof in the main body presents the
existence proof under the condition that one of the joint boundary conditions can be satised. We
therefore have to show that for some  we have
R() 2 ff(i);(ii)g;f(i);(iii)g;f(ii);(iv)g;f(i);(ii);(iii)g;f(i);(ii);(iv)gg:
Showing this takes several steps.
Step 1: Observe that there exists r such that for all ~  < r,  2 Y and x 2 X we have F2(~ ;;x) > 0;
i.e. we have ~ 0 strictly positive. Similarly, observe that there exists r such that for all  > r;  2 Y and
x 2 X we have F2(~ ;;x) < 0. The rst observation follows immediately since m0(0) > 0; q0(0) < 0 and
m00(0) < 0 and fx;fy;f;b(:) and s(:) are bounded away from zero. The second observation follows from
the fact that the elasticities of the matching function add to unity, i.e. m0()=m()   q0()=q() =
1, which implies m0() < m(). The assumption that 1=q is convex ensures that the elasticity
m0()=m() is decreasing, and therefore m0() < m() holds strictly in the limit when  grows large.
Since m() = m0()   2q0(); we have  ~ 2q0(~ ) bounded away from zero. Since m0() converges to
zero for  large as m() is bounded, this ensures the second observation.
Step 2: For  suciently small we have R()  f(ii);(iii)g: This arises because at  x the term ~ 0 is
positive and therefore the queue length declines even more at lower x, and for low market tightness 0
is large and therefore seller types are matched very quickly. Therefore, clearly neither (i) nor (iv) can
be the limit to which the dierential equation can be extended.
Similarly, for suciently high  we have R()  f(i);(iv)g. This arises because at  x the term ~ 0 is
negative and therefore the queue length rises even higher at lower x, and for high market tightness 0
is small and therefore seller types are matched very slowly. Therefore, clearly neither (ii) nor (iii) can
be the limit to which the dierential equation can be extended. Neither f(ii);(iii)g nor f(i);(iv)g can
support an equilibrium, though.
25Both boundary types making zero prots cannot be an equilibrium, as shown in Step 1 of the proof of Lemma 1.
40Step 3: Consider the lowest initial condition for which f(i);(iv)g hold, i.e. inf = inffj(i) 2 R()
or (iv) 2 R()g: By the denition of the inmum there exists a sequence fng1
n=1 with limit inf such
that (i) 2 R(n) or (iv) 2 R(n): By the upper-hemicontinuity of R(n); (i) 2 R(inf) or (iv) 2 R(inf):
Similarly, there exists a sequence fng1
n=1 with limit inf such that (ii) 2 R(n) or (iii) 2 R(n): By
the upper-hemicontinuity of R(n); (ii) 2 R(inf) or (iii) 2 R(inf): Since by Step 2 (iii) and (iv)
cannot hold simultaneously, we have
R(inf) 2 ff(i);(ii)g;f(i);(iii)g;f(ii);(iv)gf(i);(ii);(iii)g;f(i);(ii);(iv)gg:
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. Since m() = m0()=m() we have
0
m() < 0 , m() 2 





+ m00()q() < 0
, m0()q0() + m00()q() < 0
, a() < 1:
Proof of Lemma 8




m()[1    (1   m())]
 1 p (44)
s.t. q()[1    (1   q())]
 1 (f(x;y)   p) = U(x): (45)
The necessary rst order conditions are
m0()f(x;y)   [1    + q()]U(x)   q0()U(x)
1    + m()
 
m()f(x;y)   [1    + q()]U(x)
[1    + m()]
2 m0() = 0:
m()fx(x;y)   [1    + q()]U0(x)
1    + m()
= 0:
These conditions can be simplied substantially. After some algebra we get:
m0()f(x;y)   [1    + q() + (1   )q0()]U(x) = 0: (46)
q()fx(x;y)   [1    + q()]U0(x) = 0: (47)
Conditional on matching with buyer type x; we can express the optimal prot ~ (x;y) of seller y by
solving the constraint (45) for p and substituting into (44) as
~ (x;y) = max
2R+
m()f(x;y)   [1    + q()]U(x)
1    + m()
:
41The optimal queue length  for this restricted problem is still determined by optimality condition
(46); and we denote the implicit solution to (46) by (x;y). We want to see when @2~ 
@x@y > 0: The rst





1    + m()
(48)
where by the envelope theorem the eect through @






1    + m()
+

m0()fy(x;y)[1    + m()]   m()m0()fy


















m0()fx(x;y)   [1    + q() + (1   )q0()]U0(x)
m00()f(x;y)    [q0() + (1   2)q0 + (1   )q00()]U(x)
=  
m0()fx(x;y)   [1    + q() + (1   )q0()]U0(x)
m00()f(x;y)   (1   )m00()U(x)
after simplifying and using the fact that m00 = q00 + 2q0.27 Using (47) to substitute for U0(x) and (46)
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1    + m()
 
m(
)f(x;y)   [1    + q(
)]U(x)








where the square bracket is zero due to the rst of the two rst order condition.










427.2 Appendix B: Additional Results
Lemma 10 Let g denote the elasticity of function g with respect to its argument. q 1 strictly convex
is equivalent to
1. The elasticity of the derivative of the matching function being larger for buyers: q0 > m0;8 2
R+:
2. x(M) is strictly concave; where x(M) is the buyers' matching probability if sellers match with
probability M: That is, for given M there is M such that m(M) = M; and x is dened as
x(M) = q(M):
Proof. For statement 1, observe that m0()q0()m00() 1q() 1 < 2 1 is equivalent to q00()q0() 1 >
m00()m0() 1: To see this, observe the following, where we make use of m() = q() and the rela-
tionship of the derivatives resulting from this
  2q0() <  m00()q()m0() 1









, q00() < m00()q0()m0() 1 (49)
, q00()q0() 1 > m00()m0() 1:
For statement 2, since x(m()) = q() we have q0() = x0(m)m0() and q00() = x0(m)m00() +
x00(m)m0(): Therefore x00(m) < 0 is equivalent to
x00(m)m0() < 0
, q00()   x0(m)m00() < 0
, q00()   q0()m0() 1m00() < 0
which coincides with (49):
Relation between log-supermodularity of f and the conditions in Shimer and Smith (2000)
Shimer and Smith (2000) consider a match value function that ensures Positive Assortative Matching
with the following properties: weak supermodularity of f; weak log-supermodularity of fx and fy, and
weak log-supermodularity of fxy:
28 They also assume that f  0 and fy(0;y)  0  fy(1;y) for all
y. We will show that this implies weak log-supermodularity of f under the additional restriction that
higher types are better, i.e. fx(x;y)  0 (and by symmetry fy(x;y)  0).
28They consider a symmetric function f such that f (x;y) = f(y;x):
43Log-supermodularity arises when logf is supermodular, or equivalently if for all (x;y) the following
holds (where we suppress the argument):
fxyf   fxfy  0: (50)
This condition holds whenever fx = 0 because of supermodularity (fxy > 0) and f > 0.
Now we establish that condition (50) holds for any fx > 0. First, we observe that the condition
holds at (0;0) under the assumptions above. Then we show that at any (x;y) at which (50) holds, the
left hand side of (50) increases in x:29 This then establishes log-supermodularity at all (x;y): The left
hand side increases in x if
fx2yf + fxyfx   fx2fy   fxfxy  0: (51)
Now log-supermodularity of fx is assumed, which implies
fx2yfx   fx2fxy  0: (52)
Whenever fx > 0, equation (52) implies that (51) holds if
fx2fxy
fx
f + fxyfx   fx2fy   fxfxy  0: (53)
Since (50) holds, (53) holds if
fx2fxfy
fx
+ fxyfx   fx2fy   fxfxy  0;
which holds trivially.
29The argument applies symmetrically for increases in y; which establishes the result.
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